從同婚爭議論公共理性的完備性

On the Completeness of Public Reason in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate

羅爾斯主張公共理性是完備的，即根據共享的政治價值和 推論方式做判斷，將可對具爭議的重要制度和法律得出合理答 案。本文的目的是要從同性婚姻合法化的爭議，檢視公共理性的 完備性意涵。筆者將指出，各種政治正義觀可能得出不同的政治 價值合理排序，且公共理性觀無法解決「何謂婚姻？」這個背景 問題的歧見，因此完備性不能理解為對爭議議題「達成共識」。 在「達成可合理接受的制度方案」的意義下，公共理性的完備性 則可成立。為此，必須在公共理性的基礎上補充民主多數決和立 法的道德妥協。

Rawls claimed that public reason is complete| that is, it allows citizens to formulate a reasonable answer to controversial institutions and laws through judgments that appeal to shared political values and reasoning methods. The aim of this paper is to examine the meaning of the completeness of public reason by discussing the dispute over the legalization of same-sex marriage. I will point out that various political conceptions of justice may lead to different, reasonable, orderings of political values. Moreover, the conception of public reason cannot resolve the background question, ''What is marriage?'' Therefore, the meaning of the completeness of public reason cannot be understood as ''achieving consensus'' on controversial issues. Public reason is complete in the sense of ''achieving an institutional solution that can be reasonably accepted.'' To this end, it is necessary to supplement the democratic majority and legislative moral compromise based on ideals of public reason.