作為中共發揮海外影響力工具的媽祖文化

Mazu Culture: an Instrument of the Chinese Communist Party Expanding Offshore Influences

近年間在中共官方論述中，媽祖文化被上升至國家發展，推動統一等戰略位置。然而，媽祖文化為何？媽祖文化與作為民間宗教的媽祖信仰之間的關係是什麼？黨國如何運用媽祖文化以達到特定的戰略目標？回應上述問題，本文分析媽祖文化此一範疇浮現的過程、及其內涵的演變，所涉及的國家與宗教之間的動態，並聚焦分析一個與媽祖文化密切相關的官辦非政府組織──中華媽祖文化交流協會的成立脈絡、組織運作、活動推動與論述生產。本文指出：媽祖信仰社群在宗教復振過程中採取「文化化」的策略，媽祖文化此一範疇由此浮現。在信仰社群與國家議程的交織與互動中，此一範疇逐步取得官方認可，被黨國收編改造為國家的文化工具，且其目標主要在於發揮海外影響力，而非規管境內信仰社群。本文發現：雖汲取自媽祖信仰，但媽祖文化創造了去宗教化的主體位置，並以文化傳播取代宗教發展，因而得以採取文化交流的形式，作為黨國發揮海外影響力的工具。國家主導下的媽祖文化工作內容，初期以對臺媽祖文化交流為主，近期則配合一帶一路政策，推動更多海洋絲路國家的聯繫交流。以此個案，本文呈現了大統戰與大外宣時期中共民間宗教工作的新貌。

In the Xi Jinping era, Mazu culture has been officially recognized by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as an instrument in the Belt and Road Initiative and of united front work. What is Mazu culture that the People's Republic of China (PRC) party-state has frequently referred to? How does it relate to Mazu belief, a revived popular religion once officially labeled as superstition? How does the party state use Mazu culture to achieve specific strategic objectives? To answer these questions, this study analyzes the emergence and the changing connotations of the discursive category of ‘Mazu culture' in the interactions between religious communities and the party state. The study places the analytical focus on a national-level GONGO, Chinese Mazu Cultural Exchange Association, and examines this GONGO's establishment background, memberships, activities, and publications. This study points out that the strategy of “culturification” adopted by the belief community during religious revival led to the appearance of the category ‘Mazu culture' in the late 1980s. Emerging in the belief community's engagement with state agendas, this category acquired official recognition, gradually evolved, and ultimately adapted by the CCP as an official instrument to expand China's offshore influences. “De-religionizing” and “culturification” have enabled this instrumental role. The discourse of Mazu culture generates a de-religionized subject position, ‘Mazu-ren,' to replace ‘Mazu believers.' It also emphasizes ‘cultural communication and cultural transmission' instead of religious development. Mazu culture has been used strategically in the party-state's externally-directed policies: in the United Front work towards Taiwan since 1980s, and recently in the Belt and Road Initiative to boost connection with countries located along the ‘New Maritime Silk Road.' This case study of Mazu culture uncovers the instrumentalization of China's popular religions in the Great United Front and Grand External Propaganda eras.