內生化的制度選擇與長期經濟增長：以河北省縣域地區差距為例，1952～1998

Endogenous Institutions and Economic Growth: An Empirical Evidence Look into the Economic Performance at the County Level in the Hebei Province from 1952~1998

帶來經濟持續增長的良好制度往往內生於制度形成的歷史過程，通過挖掘河北省各個縣在抗日戰爭中的革命經歷，我們發現戰爭過程通過影響各個縣政治菁英的實際政治權力，塑造了他們制度選擇的動機和激勵，從而影響了地方的長期經濟增長。並且，由抗戰歷史所塑造的兩個方面實際政治權力對經濟增長的影響是不同的：當由武裝力量和根據地歷史所塑造的地方政治菁英集體行動能力和社會動員能力越強時，經濟的增長績效越好；而如果由上層革命機關分布所塑造的地方政治菁英與上層菁英之間的政治聯繫越緊密時，經濟的增長績效則會變差。

Institutions good for long-term economic growth are always endogenous to the historical process that it formed. By investigating the conflicts during the Anti-Japanese War in Hebei, we found that the war shaped the de-facto political power of local elites by shaping their choice of institutions and policy, which then influenced the economic performance. We also present that the two sides of the de-facto political power had different impacts on the economic growth. County cadres with stronger capacity in collective action and social mobilization due to the strength of military forces would have incentive to protect property rights and withstand the pressure to extract economic resources excessively. However, county cadres with close connections to the higher-level authority due to the distribution of CCP's committees in the warfare area would extract more economic resources, which in turn led to poorer growth performance.