論謝林在《自由論》中對觀念論與實在論的超越

On Schelling's Transcendence of Idealism and Realism in his Freiheitsschrift

本文檢視謝林在1809年的《自由論》中對自由與必然的對立的解決，目的在解明謝林對實在論與觀念論的批判所包含的洞見。本論文區分為四個節次，在簡短地敘述本論文的主題之後，謝林認為自由與必然並不是不相容的，對此他透過將「同一律」詮釋為「創造的同一律」而給出了這麼一種可能性。接下來謝林考察了觀念論所理解的自由，批評這種自由不能說明人類的自由的「種差」或「為善與為惡的能力」。最後筆者認為，惡的問題所直接挑戰的是哲學的體系，謝林對自由問題的解答，其實是指向一個超越實在論與觀念論的對立的更具包攝性的體系哲學。 This article examines Schelling's solution to the issue of the opposition between freedom and necessity in his Freiheitsschrift (1809). Its primary aim is to shed light on Schelling's insight through his critique on idealism and realism. The article is divided into four sections. After a brief introduction to the leading question, section one describes Schelling's refutation that freedom is incompatible with determinism. In order to solve the problem, section two depicts that he interprets the law of identity as a creative one. Then he criticizes that the idealistic freedom cannot account for the ＂specific difference＂ of human freedom or human's ＂capacity for good and evil,＂ which is illustrated in section three. It is the author's view that the issue of evil challenges all philosophical system, not just idealism and realism. Based on the author's view, section four demonstrates that Schelling's philosophical system of freedom aims at a more inclusive systematic philosophy which transcends the opposites of idealism and realism.