| 中文摘要 |
2016年1月6日北韓進行第四次核試爆至2017年9月3日進行第六次核試爆，是北韓史上最密集發展核武及遠端投射能力的時期，這使美朝關係因此陷入年金正恩掌權以來最危險的時刻，雙方開戰傳言不斷。本文回顧這段期間的美朝戰略互動，發現雙方關係較貼近「螺旋模式」而非「嚇阻理論」假設。據此，若美朝對彼此「認知（perception）」無法調整，則雙方將因自我的不安全感無法解除，使對峙局面持續。而美朝關係能否走向緩解，關鍵不在美朝無止盡地提升對彼此的嚇阻手段強度，而在於美朝間能持續遵守對對方的善意承諾。
From January 6, 2016 to September 3, 2017, North Korea has executedthree times of nuclear weapon testing, marking the highest frequency oftesting in its history. As a result, this tension later built up the worst time ofU.S.-North Korea relations after Kim Jong-un ruled the country. Because ofthis tension, there are a large number of reports that predict the U.S. willfight North Korea at any time. This research reviews the strategic interactionsbetween U.S. and North Korea during that period, and then argues that thesituation between these two countries is more similar to the hypothesis ofspiral model than deterrence theory. Hence, the U.S. and North Korea willkeep indulging in “security dilemma,” which will cause prolonged hostilitybetween these two countries if both sides maintain the original“misperception.” The key to solve the deadlock does not depend on whetheror not North Korea or the U.S would continue to engage in deterrencebehavior against each other, but rather how much both sides are willing toabide by their mutual promise. |
本站僅提供期刊文獻檢索。
