餘波猶存？船過無痕？南海仲裁判斷就海洋法公約第121條第3款解釋適用之啟發、疏略與侷限

The Illumination, Neglect, and Limit of the South China Sea Arbitration Award on the Interpretation and Application of Article 121(3) of the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention: A Taiwanese perspective

菲中南海仲裁判斷出爐迄今二年有餘，各方討論未歇。本文認為，欲實質挑戰仲裁判斷認事用法之正確性，最有效之方式在於直指仲裁判斷本身對於公約條文之解釋可能存有之錯誤、矛盾或難以適用之處，或能指摘仲裁判斷就重要事實之認定發生錯漏，以致於縱然適用其本身所定基準，其結果亦未臻正確。基此，本文先就本次仲裁判斷就聯合國海洋法公約第121條第3款之解釋適用予以簡要介紹，其後指明此次仲裁判斷針對第121條第3款本身之解釋、適用以及在將其自身建立之標準具體適用於太平島時，有下列有待斟酌之諸多問題，值得挑戰：一、忽略人類科技進步對公約解釋產生之可能影響；二、過度將「維持人類居住」限縮至長久定居，並排除所謂軍事、或其他人員之駐守可能產生誤判；三、忽略太平島確因戒嚴及軍事管制等外在介入因素，導致無平民定居；四、否定所謂軍事或政府人員之進駐為「人類定居」致使實踐上容有灰色地帶；五、排除利用周邊專屬經濟區或大陸架所行之經濟活動為「本身的經濟生活」亦顯過度限縮。其後，本文表明此一仲裁判斷除了對於海洋法發展之過程堪稱里程碑外，其所採取徑亦非全然悖於臺灣之利益，值得思考在全盤否定之外，是否容有更多想像。最終，本文亦指出此仲裁判斷對於解決如南海爭議此類複雜海洋議題，本質仍有侷限。 Although there are many ways to challenge the validity of a judicial decision or an arbitration award, the author believes that the most effective way is to point out when the tribunal has erred in its interpretation or in applying its own interpretation on the facts in issue. After briefing the Arbitral Tribunal’s interpretation of Article 121(3) of the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) and the application of its own interpretation toward Itu Aba (Taiping Island), the author argues that the South China Sea Arbitration Award is erroneous in many ways. First, it failed to consider that the interpretation of the UNCLOS should evolve with the development of technology. Second, the extremely strict approach taken by the Arbitral Tribunal in interpreting “human habitation”, which declines to take into account the evidence of an official or military population, may obstruct the Arbitral Tribunal in correctly evaluating the natural capacity of a given island. Third, and perhaps the most importantly, the Arbitral Tribunal failed to consider that the presence of an official or military population and the lack of civilian habilitation on Itu Aba is the result of Martial Law and the later national security mechanisms imposed by the Taiwanese government, which constitutes an intervening force that shall fall within the exception the Arbitral Tribunal held. Fourth, the approach not to consider the presence of official or military population leaves ambiguities in the application for states to circumvent. Finally, the extremely narrow approach taken by the Arbitral Tribunal in interpreting “economic life of its own”, which excludes the use of economic activity derived from a possible exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, may be too narrow to accommodate human technologies and lifestyles. After pointing out deficiencies in the Arbitration Award, the author nevertheless argues that the narrow approach taken by the Arbitral Tribunal in interpreting Article 121(3) of the UNCLOs may still be in the interests of Taiwan, as such an approach discourages human additions to, or modifications of, an island for the purpose of claiming marine entitlements under the UNCLOS. Therefore, if this approach is followed, it may no longer be necessary for Taiwan to invest—or even over-invest—resources in Itu Aba and other controlled islands so as to compete with other resourceful states adjoining the South China Sea. Nevertheless, despite seeing the virtue of the approach taken by the Arbitral Tribunal, the author concludes that due to the limits of the Arbitration Award, it may still fall short in providing guidance for handling complex situations like that of the South China Sea.