法規審查制度運行的雙重悖論

從運行實踐觀之，法規審查制度存在兩大悖論。其一，審查請求權配置不平衡遭遇激勵失靈的窘境。立法者所偏愛的重要機關並未行使審查請求權。與之相反，公民、其他組織等成為審查建議的主要提出主體。其二，申請資格門檻低與審查實體要求高之間存在張力。同時，成功的審查個案表明，該制度初步顯現出由抽象審查向准附帶性審查轉化的跡象。為了破解悖論一，立法機關應當慎重評估賦權重要機關的必要性，以避免因長期虛置影響審查制度的權威。更有效的方案是將法律詢問答覆制度與常委會主動審查進行嫁接。解決悖論二的長遠之計應當包括建立審查建議篩選機制等，但近期不宜建立過於嚴密的篩選機制，以免造成審查制度本身動力不足。

There are two types of dilemmas arising from the operation of the review system of regulations. On the one hand, the imbalanced, discriminatory empowerment model for initiating the review process fails to meet its original goals. Important state organs-the legislature's favorites-have never exercised the initiating right. On the contrary, citizens and other entities become the major initiators. On the other hand, there exists a tension between the loose requirements on initiating thresholds and the rigid substantive standards for having the challenged regulations annulled. In the meantime, successful cases indicate that the review system is transforming itself from an abstract review to acontroversy-based, concrete review model. To overcome the first dilemma, the article submits that the NPC shall reevaluate the necessity of granting the initiating power to state organs. An alternative is to integrate the NPCSC's ex officio review power with the enquiry-response system. The long-term solution for the second dilemma includes establishing comprehensive threshold requirements for review applications. Currently, however, too rigid threshold requirements will prevent the review system from thriving.