論郭象《莊子注》中的「德」

On “Virtue＂in Guo Xiang's “Notes on Zhuangzi＂

「德」是早期道家哲學中，在「道」之下，落實於萬物之中的重要概念。兩漢、魏晉以來，由於哲學思辨的差異，「道」、「德」逐漸分化成為兩個並立的範疇；甚至，「德」不再依附在「道」下詮說，而獨立成為一內涵豐富的哲學語彙。其中，郭象便是重要的代表。郭象《莊子注》認為宇宙萬物乃獨化、自生，故其否定了莊子將「道」做為萬物的形上根源，並以「自然」來釋「道」。而在此獨化自生的學說中，郭象是以萬物之「性分」來詮釋「德」的，這也逸離了莊子「德即是體現道」的思考脈絡。究竟郭象如何詮釋「德」？其對「德」的詮釋，又如何在獨化自生的核心思想下開展？本文即試圖闡析郭象「德」觀的哲學意涵。 “De”(Virtue) is an important concept in the discussion of “Tao”in the universe in the early Taoist philosophy. “De” is always interpreted with reference to “Tao.”Yet since the Han and Jin Dynasty, the discussion has a great development on the discrepancy of De and Tao. Virtue gains its theoretical understanding without regard to “Tao.” Guo Xiang is one of the representatives. Guo Xiang's “Notes on Zhuangzi”proposes that the universe is composed of beings that are self-referential. In Guo's term, they are “Du-hua”(self-emergent) and “, Zi -sheng” (Self-developing). This proposal turns down the long-lasting hypotheses in “Zhuangzi＂that Tao is the origin of the universe, and Tao is Nature. Guo believes that everything has its property by which De is justified. In this respect, Guo provides an alternative in understanding the Zhuangzi theory that De embodies Tao. The paper attempts to analyze Guo's discussions on De, particularly with a focus on the interpretation of De with regards to Du-hua and Zi -sheng.