內戰時國際法制秩序對限制暴力的影響探討：議題領域如何作用？

The International Legal Order and Restraint of Violence in Civil Wars: How Issue Areas of Conflicts Matter?

This research aims at conducting a dissertation of understanding how issue areas influence the implementation of international legal order in restraining violence toward civilians in civil wars. I treat conflict as continuum. When a civil war is newly developed, tangible issues such as competition for resources, territory, and political position will dominate. These issues are negotiable, and belligerents tend to follow the rule in order to avoid being punished by the international community. However, when conflict escalates, intangible issues such as ethnic resentment and social hatred will interfere, drive out emotions and make the situation more complicated. This will make belligerents act less rationally and disobey the international legal order owing to the emotional-oriented domestic support. I intend to prove my argument through three case studies: The Bosnian War (1992–1995), the Kosovo War (1996–1999), and the Darfur Crisis (2003–2006). 本研究將探討內戰時議題領域的變化如何影響國際法制秩序限制交戰各造對平民的暴力行為。本人認為在內戰時，衝突的變化應被視為連續體。當內戰剛剛發生時，具象的議題領域，例如對資源、領土、以及政治地位的爭奪等，會使交戰雙方傾向於接受國際法制秩序的限制，這是由於這些議題是可被談判的，而遵守國際法制秩序可使交戰各造避免被國際社會懲罰，藉以避開不必要的成本。但當衝突升高時，抽象議題—例如種族與社會方面的憎恨—將會介入衝突，此會使交戰各造做出不理性的決定，且由於內部團體被情緒所激發，使交戰各造誤認為受到支持，因此會錯估情勢，不遵守國際法制規範，並造成侵害人權的行為。本人將藉由以下三個案例分析來證明本人的論點：波士尼亞戰爭（1992－1995）、盧安達內戰（1990－1994）、哥倫比亞內戰（1964－2016）。