股票基礎薪酬與海外直接投資

Stock-Based Compensation and Foreign Direct Investment

本研究探討經理人股票基礎薪酬（stock-based compensation）對海外直接投資（foreign direct investment，簡稱 FDI）之影響。FDI通常可擴大規模經濟及藉由特定區域優勢形成協同效應（synergy effects）以增加企業價值，但FDI會因營運複雜度增加及監督困難而造成股東與經理人的代理衝突。根據代理理論，股權誘因可調和經理人利益與股東價值，因此本研究預期並發現前期給予經理人股票基礎薪酬會使次期FDI增加，尤其是當FDI屬於價值型投資。此外因為家族企業具有控制股東與少數股東利益不一致之核心代理衝突，因此本研究又發現家族企業會對股票基礎薪酬與FDI關聯性產生影響，當FDI是價值型投資時，家族企業經理人股票基礎薪酬並不會誘使FDI增加，亦即本研究之實證結果是支持家族企業具有利益掠奪效果，並非是利益一致效果。 This study investigates how stock-based compensation affects foreign direct investment (FDI). Previous studies indicate that FDI can add firm value by economies of scale, location-specific advantages, and synergy effects. However, FDI also increases agency conflicts between stockholders and managers because of complex operating and difficult monitoring. Based on agency theory's perspective, incentives of stock can align managers' interests with shareholder value. Therefore, we hypothesize and find that stock-based compensation leads to a “subsequent” increase in FDI when FDI may create an excess income from investment. In addition, because family-controlled firms are characterized by a core agency conflict between dominant and minority shareholders, we also find that the family-controlled characteristic can affect the relationship between stock-based compensation and FDI. Managers of family firms may not make rational FDI-increasing decisions in response to stock-based compensations, thereby supporting entrenchment effect rather than alignment effect.

This study investigates how stock-based compensation affects foreign direct investment (FDI). Previous studies indicate that FDI can add firm value by economies of scale, location-specific advantages, and synergy effects. However, FDI also increases agency conflicts between stockholders and managers because of complex operating and difficult monitoring. Based on agency theory's perspective, incentives of stock can align managers' interests with shareholder value. Therefore, we hypothesize and find that stock-based compensation leads to a “subsequent” increase in FDI when FDI may create an excess income from investment. In addition, because family-controlled firms are characterized by a core agency conflict between dominant and minority shareholders, we also find that the family-controlled characteristic can affect the relationship between stock-based compensation and FDI. Managers of family firms may not make rational FDI-increasing decisions in response to stock-based compensations, thereby supporting entrenchment effect rather than alignment effect.