機構投資人、董事會結構、薪酬與關係人交易

Institutional Investors, Board Structure, Compensation and Related Party Transactions

許多公司不當使用關係人交易，將其視為利益輸送的管道，移轉利益給關係人，進而掏空公司資產。本研究以機構投資人、董事會特性及薪酬契約觀點來探討其對於關係人交易之影響，並檢測關係人交易運用程度是否影響公司績效。以2006年至2013年且有運用關係人交易之台灣上市櫃公司為研究對象，主要研究結論為在董事會特性方面，董事會規模越大、獨立董事比例越低將不利於對關係人交易之監督，但薪酬契約對大部分的關係人交易能發揮監督能力；在外部監督方面，主動機構投資人持股越高，關係人交易運用程度越低，對於管理階層具有監督效果，而被動機構投資人持股與關係人交易之運用程度為正向關係；關係人交易運用程度越高，對公司未來營運績效有不利的影響。 Numerous companies improperly use related-party (RP) transactions, which are regarded as a method of transferring interest to stakeholders and then disposing the company's assets. This study investigated the influence of a monitoring mechanism and compensation on RP transactions from the perspectives of institutional investors, board structures, and compensation contracts. Furthermore, it explored whether considerable differences exist between the usage extent of RP transactions and company performance. The results indicated that a large board size and fewer independent members on the board are not beneficial for monitoring RP transactions. They also indicated that the compensation contracts can serve as a monitoring mechanism for RP transactions. Less RP transactions were observed for active institutional investors with high shareholding ratios. The shareholding ratios of passive institutional investors and the usage extent of RP transactions were found to be positively related. Furthermore, companies that frequently engaged in RP transactions demonstrated more unfavorable future performance.

Numerous companies improperly use related-party (RP) transactions, which are regarded as a method of transferring interest to stakeholders and then disposing the company's assets. This study investigated the influence of a monitoring mechanism and compensation on RP transactions from the perspectives of institutional investors, board structures, and compensation contracts. Furthermore, it explored whether considerable differences exist between the usage extent of RP transactions and company performance. The results indicated that a large board size and fewer independent members on the board are not beneficial for monitoring RP transactions. They also indicated that the compensation contracts can serve as a monitoring mechanism for RP transactions. Less RP transactions were observed for active institutional investors with high shareholding ratios. The shareholding ratios of passive institutional investors and the usage extent of RP transactions were found to be positively related. Furthermore, companies that frequently engaged in RP transactions demonstrated more unfavorable future performance.