財務報表品質檢驗：外國企業與本國企業之比較

Financial Reporting Quality Investigation: Evidence from Foreign Companies vs. Domestic Companies

本研究主要透過Hopeetal.（2013）以及Ball & Shivakumar（2005）分析模式檢驗本國企業與外國企業來台上市（櫃）的財務報表品質。蒐集2010-2013年台灣經濟新報資料庫所收錄財務資料，有完整財務報表品質及會計師事務所特徵樣本共3,723筆。本研究發現，相較於本國企業，外國企業財務報表品質比較差。此結果不論是在Heckman樣本選擇偏誤修正模式、傾向分數配對模式、透過不同財務報表品質衡量、與同時期IPO本國企業比較以及控制投資者保護機制後皆呈現一致性結果。再者，本研究發現內部公司治理機制對於外國企業僅存在形式效果卻無法改善財務報表品質；然而外部公司治理機制之實施卻能有效提升財務報表品質。最後，本研究也發現再次融資亦可能為外國企業財務報表較差因素之一。 This paper compare the financial reporting quality of foreign firms with and domestic firms listed in Taiwan stock market by adopting the model of Hope et al. (2013) and Ball & Shivakumar (2005). Based on the data from Taiwan Economics Journal from 2010 to 2013, we find that domestic firms have higher financial reporting quality than foreign firms. Our results are robust after we using Heckman two stage model, propensity score matching, and other different financial reporting quality measurement, to compare with domestic IPO firms and control investor protection mechanism. Moreover, we also show that the internal corporate governance (i.e. board component) for foreign firms appears effective in form but is not in substance. However, the external corporate governance mechanism (i.e. substantive review) can enhance financial reporting quality for foreign firms in substance and support legal bonding. Finally, we find foreign firms are more likely to issue convert bond after initial public offerings. This alter evidence demonstrates that foreign firms have more incentive to manipulate earnings which result in poor financial reporting quality.

This paper compare the financial reporting quality of foreign firms with and domestic firms listed in Taiwan stock market by adopting the model of Hope et al. (2013) and Ball & Shivakumar (2005). Based on the data from Taiwan Economics Journal from 2010 to 2013, we find that domestic firms have higher financial reporting quality than foreign firms. Our results are robust after we using Heckman two stage model, propensity score matching, and other different financial reporting quality measurement, to compare with domestic IPO firms and control investor protection mechanism. Moreover, we also show that the internal corporate governance (i.e. board component) for foreign firms appears effective in form but is not in substance. However, the external corporate governance mechanism (i.e. substantive review) can enhance financial reporting quality for foreign firms in substance and support legal bonding. Finally, we find foreign firms are more likely to issue convert bond after initial public offerings. This alter evidence demonstrates that foreign firms have more incentive to manipulate earnings which result in poor financial reporting quality.