日本的北韓政策及其侷限－－以2017年北韓核武與飛彈試射為例（Japan’s North Korea Policy and Its Limitations: a Case Study of Pyongyang’s 2017 Nuclear and Missile Tests）

日本の対北朝鮮政策とその限界―北朝鮮による2017 年の核・ミサイル実験を例として―

日本首相安倍晉三於2017 年9 月25 日突然對外表示，將在臨時國會開議後（同年9 月28 日）宣布解散眾議院，並且訂於同年10 月22 日舉行大選。儘管安倍首相強調，這次解散國會是為了「克服國難」（日文是「國難突破」，安倍首相定調此次解散改選為「國難突破解散」），是為了克服日本急遽惡化的少子高齡化問題，開創國家未來，並「面對北韓威脅」，全力保障國民生命安全及和平生活。安倍首相強調，他會傾注全心全意，與全體國民共同突破。對於日本而言，這一連串的北韓核武試驗或飛彈試射事件，日本的因應措施其實是相當尷尬的。安倍晉三首相在2017 年9 月以「克服國難」為由，解散眾議院進行改選，這種以外交危機轉換國內政治利益的手段，雖然讓安倍首相得以繼續執政，可是，外交上的危機仍未化解。本文的寫作，是以2017 年到2018 年東北亞局勢發展為背景，進而觀察日本的北韓政策及其可能的侷限，並且藉此分析與預期日本未來可能的安保政策之演變。 On September 25, 2017, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abeannounced that he would disband the House of Representatives after theopening of the interim Congress in 3 days on September 28 and that he wouldstart holding general elections on October 22. Despite Prime Minister ShinzoAbe’s emphasis at the beginning on the latest disbandment was aimed at“overcoming the national crisis,” (or in Japanese, “a national disasterbreakthrough), he later announced this change in government and re-electionis a way to overcome Japan’s rapid decline in the minority population,leaving more seniors than young people, which Prime Minister has namedthis action as “National Crisis Disbandment.” In addition to providing asolution to the rise in seniors and decline in the later generations, thisdisbandment has a few other goals: to create a national future as a way toface the threats of North Korea, all the while to ensure the safety of citizensand to maintain a peaceful life. Prime Minister later emphasized that he willdevote himself wholeheartedly with the people of Japan in solving theseissues together. With North Korea’s recent developments in nuclearweaponry, Japan’s way of handling its relationship with North Korea isawkward at best due to the Prime Minister’s decision in choosing to disband the House of Representatives. This method of handling foreign affairs byrestructuring the inner government only benefits the inside and theinternational crisis remains unsolved. This paper uses references from theNortheast Asia Development 2017-2018 as background material,observations on Japan and North Korea relations and other possiblelimitations that may arise, and uses this analysis to predict Japan’s futurechange and evolution in its security policy.

On September 25, 2017, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abeannounced that he would disband the House of Representatives after theopening of the interim Congress in 3 days on September 28 and that he wouldstart holding general elections on October 22. Despite Prime Minister ShinzoAbe’s emphasis at the beginning on the latest disbandment was aimed at“overcoming the national crisis,” (or in Japanese, “a national disasterbreakthrough), he later announced this change in government and re-electionis a way to overcome Japan’s rapid decline in the minority population,leaving more seniors than young people, which Prime Minister has namedthis action as “National Crisis Disbandment.” In addition to providing asolution to the rise in seniors and decline in the later generations, thisdisbandment has a few other goals: to create a national future as a way toface the threats of North Korea, all the while to ensure the safety of citizensand to maintain a peaceful life. Prime Minister later emphasized that he willdevote himself wholeheartedly with the people of Japan in solving theseissues together. With North Korea’s recent developments in nuclearweaponry, Japan’s way of handling its relationship with North Korea isawkward at best due to the Prime Minister’s decision in choosing to disband the House of Representatives. This method of handling foreign affairs byrestructuring the inner government only benefits the inside and theinternational crisis remains unsolved. This paper uses references from theNortheast Asia Development 2017-2018 as background material,observations on Japan and North Korea relations and other possiblelimitations that may arise, and uses this analysis to predict Japan’s futurechange and evolution in its security policy.