英文摘要 |
After undergoing rapid economic development for many years, China is beginning to see many new problems emerging, such as overproduction, contradiction between the coal and electricity, bankruptcy of the solar panel industry, the crash of the stock market, a huge local debt, and others. In the financial industry, while there has been a rocketing growth and a rise in innovative production, the regulatory system still has failed to manage the market. The state-owned enterprises enjoy easier banking loan and preferential policies than their private counterparts and are even able to challenge the regulatory agencies. Why has the former regulatory structure of yihang sanhui (one bank and three commissions) been unable to govern the industry? What are the problems about the regulatory designs? Why did the regulatory capture happene in an authoritarian state? This article aims to answer these questions by adopting a new-institutionalist approach and exploring the evolvement of regulatory system in China's financial industry. This article also argues that the insufficiency of regulatory capacity has its roots in the institutional contradiction. That is to say, while China was adopting the Western style neoliberal regulatory system, it also has converted the system into an administrative-oriented one in order to fit into China's unique political regime. In the end, the regulatory agencies have been unable to regulate the market and suffered from regulatory failure. This article illustrates the political economy of China's state regulation and sheds lights on the state-market relationship in the authoritarian state. |