地方保護與市場競爭機制之運作──以中國鋼鐵業為例

LOCAL PROTECTIONISM AND MARKET MECHANISM: THE CASE OF THE CHINESE STEEL INDUSTRY

本研究以中國鋼鐵業為例，探討中國的地方保護主義對市場競爭機制的運作可能造成之影響。由於本文發現，中國上游鋼鐵業的企業進出比例明顯高於他國，顯示市場的高度競爭，但卻長期存在產能過剩的問題難以緩解，因此本文欲對此矛盾現象提出解釋。本研究假設此現象源於中國地方政府扶植產業的方式，造成一般企業在中國鋼鐵市場的「易進」和受扶持企業的「難出」所導致；亦即，近年來中國地方政府不是採一般保護主義方式的設立貿易堡壘，而是對一般企業低價出讓土地、提供優惠貸款等扶持行為，降低了鋼鐵業的市場進入門檻；其對受扶持廠商提供優惠貸款、減稅或補貼虧損廠商的行為，降低了它們退出市場的機率。而本研究認為中國地方政府實行此扶持行為之偏好，對不同類型的廠商，在進入和退出市場的容易度上產生不同的影響，因此本文對容易受到扶持的廠商類型進行推論，將1998至2007年中國上游鋼鐵廠商依規模大小和所有權差異進行分類，檢測何類型廠商易於進入或不易退出市場，因而導致高度競爭的市場環境；並檢測留存企業的生產力增減是否對其市占率變動產生正向影響，以及生產力低的企業是否易於退出市場，以檢驗市場競爭機制的運作情形。結果顯示，私營和小型廠商較容易進入中國鋼鐵市場，至於企業的退出，則是無論國私企，規模愈大的企業愈不易退出市場，與本研究所提較小規模或民營企業較容易接受扶持進入市場，和規模愈大的企業，愈容易受到保護而不易退出市場的推論相符；此外，中國上游鋼鐵業的市場競爭機制，在留存企業的「優勝劣敗」上能有效運作，但淘汰落後廠商的機制卻受到阻礙的分析節我，同樣支持本文假設。而這些分析結果解釋了中國鋼鐵業何以存在高度競爭，卻長期有產能過剩問題的矛盾現象。

In this paper we investigate the impacts of local protectionism on the development of the Chinese steel industry. We find that the entry and exit rates of the enterprises in the Chinese steel industry from 1998 to 2007 are much higher than those of other countries, which shows that this industry is highly competitive. There has, however, been an overcapacity problem in China’s steel industry for a long time. Hence, we try to account for the contradiction between the two phenomena. We assume that the above situation results from the way the Chinese local governments promote the steel industry. That is, the Chinese local governments would offer preferential loans, land at low prices, and other favors to attract firms to enter the steel sector. They would also provide tax breaks or subsidized loans to certain targeted firms, so that these firms would be less likely to exit the industry when they incur losses. This policy tends to raise the exit threshold for the favored firms. We hence argue that the way the Chinese local governments promote the steel firms may have different effects on the entry and exit thresholds of different kinds of firms. We then examine how the entry and exit rates differed for different kinds of steel enterprises in terms of scale and ownership from 1998 to 2007, and test if an increase in the enterprise’s productivity increased its market share and whether enterprises with low productivity exited the market more easily, in order to see if the market mechanism in China’s steel market was working during this period. Our results reveal that private and smaller firms were more likely to enter the steel industry, and large-scale firms, no matter whether they are state-owned or private firms, were less likely to exit the industry. Furthermore, the market mechanism in China’s steel sector was able to work effectively among the existing firms, but the mechanism weeding out backward firms was impeded. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that the way the Chinese local officials promote the steel firms leads to long-term overcapacity in the Chinese steel industry, while the market remains highly competitive.