內生雙邊異質性、代工廠商自創品牌升級與政府政策

ENDOGENOUS TWO-SIDED HETEROGENEITY, OWN-BRAND STRATEGIES, AND GOVERNMENT POLICY

本研究建構垂直分工的南北兩國模型，以探討代工廠商朝自創品牌升級的動態演進過程。當中，外生因素決定了北國先進廠商專注於品牌經營，南國的後進廠商職司產品代工。首先，利用靜態分析內生決定合作廠商雙方的異質性。執行外包的先進廠商選擇是否經營海外市場，代工廠商則決定代工技術的生產力，二者交互作用之下，均衡時，外包廠商間所經營的市場範圍有所差異，而代工廠商則在代工的生產技術上有所不同。經由此一機制，同質性的廠商可以有不同的作為，廠商的異質性由此生成。接著將模型延伸到動態架構，代工廠商可以經由自創品牌升級，但面臨了填補品牌經營技術不足所需要的升級成本。藉由這些設定，產業內代工廠商的升級呈現漸進式的擴散過程，據此探討代工廠商的異質性，以及政府政策在升級調整時程上所發揮的作用。本文的結論是：（1）代工廠商並不必然選擇升級為品牌廠商，代工技術水平影響升級的機率，選用生產力較高的代工技術，完成升級的機率較高；若能升級，升級的時點也較早；（2）政府政策有助於促進產業升級，不論是關稅保護，或是補貼措施，均使得產業內開始升級的時點提早，進程加快，完成升級的廠商家數增加。

We present a model of two-sided heterogeneity to explore dynamic perspectives on the upgrading of latecomer firms from subcontracting to own-brand manufacturing (OBM). We first characterized the equilibrium of two-sided heterogeneity as resulting from the interaction between the characteristics of competing subcontracting technologies and differences in foreign market access across contractors. We embedded the static results in a dynamic setting to address questions concerning the long-term evolution of subcontractors within the industry. Sustained upgrades were driven by heterogeneity and the expenses involved in branding. In particular, this proposed model predicts that the probability that a subcontractor firm will decide to perform branding increases when the firm produces goods that exhibit high-productivity technology. Furthermore, we demonstrate that government measures can enhance industrial upgrades to be accomplished through branding. Both tariffs and subsidies can expedite the subcontractor adoption of OBM strategy, and may persuade a higher number of OBM players to join.