為承認而制禮：重審荀子思想定位的當代可能性

The Making of Ritual for Recognition: Towards a New Understanding of Xunzi’s Thought

荀子的思想在中國思想傳統裡一直較受爭議，這與其著名的「性惡」論述及其維護君主專制的保守嫌疑息息相關，而當我們借鑒當代批判理論的代表性人物霍耐特 （Axel Honneth） 的「承認」理論來重新看待荀子時，則有望從中發掘出積極的當代活力。本文 首先通過分析荀子與霍布斯 （Thomas Hobbes, 1588-1679） 的差異，以揭示出傳統理解所忽視的「禮」立基於「羣」的重要面向；接著參考霍耐特建構其「相互承認」理論的策 略，嘗試將荀子思想中的「欲」放在社會倫理生活的後天形塑作用中來理解，使人欲獲得承認的基礎，並使其與禮義之間的距離有了消解的可能。更重要的是，進一步通過結 合性惡論論證所隱含的道德張力，與君子在荀子思想中關鍵而曖昧的地位，我們有望描 繪出一個充滿社會動力學色彩的「制禮」之作為過程，並為當代政治、倫理的思考帶來 新的啟示。

Throughout history, aspects of Xunzi’s thought, in particular his argument that human nature is evil and his approval of autocratic monarchy, have generated a great deal of controversy. Borrowing resources from Axel Honneth’s “Recognition” theory, this article looks at Xunzi’s philosophy from a fresh perspective. It begins by comparing Xunzi with Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in an effort to show how Xunzi’s conception of ritual was based in a communal context, a fact that opens the door to a dialogue between Xunzi and Honneth. Then, consulting the strategy Honneth employs to construct his theory, I consider the possibility of eliminating the gap between “desire” and “ritual” by placing Xunzi’s notion of desire within the concrete ethical circumstances of daily life. In addition, by revealing the moral tension hidden between Xunzi’s conception of the human nature and the key but ambiguous position of the junzi, I hope to show not only that the process of making ritual is full of social color, but also that it can provide a new source of inspiration for thinking about contemporary politics and ethics.