英文摘要 |
How to design the political system in a post-conflict society is an important theoretical issue, and also a difficult challenge for the political engineers. This paper, based on the experiences of Bosnia and Rwanda which have experienced serious ethnic conflict and civil war, discusses how the countries designed their political systems after the end of the conflict. These two countries have experienced the most serious ethnic conflicts since World War II, and these conflicts both took place in the early 1990s. Furthermore, over the past two decades both countries have adopted consociational democracatic systems in varying degrees after the conflict. Therefore I believe enough time has passed to evaluate their practices of power-sharing. The study found that in Bosnia the principles of proportionality and parity have been adopted, so as to ensure the power-sharing of the three ethnic groups. However, the political system paid the cost of consolidating existing ethnic boundaries, and it is still difficult for three ethnic groups to cooperate mutually. In Rwanda, compared to the Hutu majority, the Tutsi minority obtained political power which exceeds its ethnic population ratio. Besides, fair competition between political parties is also restricted. In other words, consociational democracy of the two countries was generally not considered to be successful. Nevertheless, Bosnia and Rwanda have at least maintained the peace and there have been no serious ethnic conflicts and violence for the past two decades. |