現象學意識分析中的「共現」——與胡塞爾同行的嘗試

“Appresentation” in phenomenological analyses of consciousness－An attempt to go along with Husserl

在「共現」（Appräsentation） 是少數幾個獨具胡塞爾現象學特徵的核心哲學概念之一。他在其意識分析中清楚地確定了在「事物經驗」和「他人經驗」中「共現」的存在，並暗示了在「自身經驗」中「共現」的存在。在此基礎上，這裏隨胡塞爾一同嘗試的分析將進一步表明：「共現」同樣在「圖像表像」、「符號表像」與「本質直觀」中一同起作用，即是說，「共現」這種經驗方式存在於所有表像或直觀的行為之中，即存在於所有經驗之中。我們在胡塞爾這裏已經可以看到一門「共現學」或「共現現象學」的雛型。對「共現」的研究一方面與對「統覺」的考察有內在的聯繫，另一方面也無法與「視域」的思想相分離，因而共現現象學是與統覺現象學和視域現象學並肩而行的。

“Appresentation” (Appräsentation) is one of the several core concepts with Husserlian phenomenological characteristics. In his analyses of consciousness, Husserl has definitely determined the existence of “appresentation” in both “thing-experiences” and “Other-experiences”, and has as suggested its existence in “self-experiences”. On this ground, my analysis along with Husserl will further indicate: “appresentation” plays the same role in “picture presentation”, “symbol presentation” and “eidetic intuition”. This is to say that the experiencing mode of “appresentation” exists in each presentation or intuition, namely, in all the experiences. We can already see the embryo of a “theory of appresentation” or a “phenomenology of appresentation”. Studies on “appresentation” are interrelated with investigations pertinent to “apperception” on the one side, and are inseparable from the thought of “horizon” on the other. As the consequence, phenomenology of appresentation goes beside phenomenology of apperception and phenomenology of horizon.