湖洛論辯之兩種未發論──韓儒巍巖李柬和南塘韓元震對未發論之不同解釋

Two Interpretations of Weifa (未發) in Korean Confucians' Horak Debates

在韓國朝鮮時代（1392-1910 年）的新儒學開展上有過兩大哲學論辯：一是十六世紀的四端七情論辯，二是十八世紀的湖洛論辯。論辯之結果，這兩次論辯產生了兩種不同立場。本文探討湖洛論辯的代表人物李柬和韓元震對「未發」的不同解釋。在朱子思想中，「未發之中」是一切道德行為的大本，故對諸性理學者未發論是極重要的。筆者嘗試湖洛論辯的兩種未發論，來源自在儒家道德思想上的兩種態度：即不是汎道德主義，就是純粹道德主義。

Chu Hsi's creative theory on weifa (未發) is one of the decisive factors separating Neo-Confucianism from other strands of Confucianism, however, it is possibly imperfect and as yet undecided. It is supported by the fact that Neo-Confucians have raised two interpretations of weifa in Neo- Confucianism. This thesis examines, on moral philosophical grounds, the two interpretations that Woiam Yi Gan and Namdang Han Won-jin suggested and disputed on weifa. Researches on the weifa theories of Yi Gan and Han Wonjin have focused on their assertions and data. This is the time to explain 'how two different weifa theories originated?' or 'what are the philosophical grounds of the two weifa theories?' The author takes the point of view that Yi Gan and Han Won-jin's agreement on weifa theory arises from Pure Moralism, tries to establish a fundamentally pure field of moralism, and Pan- Moralism, admits a basis of 'distinction' or 'difference' on qi (氣) and disapproves of that 'distinction' or 'difference' on li (理).