董事會特性、外部監督力量對董監事薪酬之影響

The effects of board characteristics and external monitors on board compensation

肥貓稱謂對於董監事似乎過於沉重。本研究探討董監事薪酬，是否受董事會特性或是外部力量的影響？本文以2005年至2015年台灣上市櫃公司為研究對象，經實證證明，公司績效越好，董監事的薪酬也會跟著一同增加；董事會規模越大，人數越多，所分配到的董監的薪酬也會跟著水漲船高。而獨立董監事的席次，正好與董監事薪酬成反比。顯示具有超然地位的獨立董監事人數越多，越能發揮監督的力量，降低董監事薪酬水準。而董事長兼任總經理的變數，與董監事薪酬呈現負相關。家族企業的董監持股質押比率與董監薪事酬有正向關係。外部監督力量對於家族企業的董事薪酬沒有顯著影響，但是會抑制非家族企業的董監事薪酬。

The name of “fat cat” seems to be heavy for director or supervisor. In this study we explore whether the remuneration of the directors and supervisors is affected by board characteristics or external monitoring forces. With an sample of listed companies in Taiwan from 2005 to 2015, we find that the remuneration of directors and supervisors is positively related to firm performance and board size, but negatively related to number of independent directors and CEO-Board chair. We also found a positive relationship between the directors' share mortgage ratio and remuneration in family firms. The external monitoring power has no significant effect on the remuneration of directors in family firms, but will suppress the remuneration of directors in non-family firms.