英文摘要 |
Using a sample of publicly traded companies on Taiwan Stock Exchange during 2001-2012, this paper explores whether the chairman or CEOs attempt to transfer stocks to their family members as gifts when their stock prices were perceived to be the lowest in order to reduce the gift tax. Moreover, this paper also examines whether the timing effect is more obvious under higher gift tax rate, higher ownership transfer rate and in month other than December. The empirical results find that the cumulative abnormal returns is significant negative before the chairman or CEOs ownership transfer to their family members. But, the abnormal returns is not significant positive following CEOs’ stock gifts to family members. Thus, the chairman or CEOs indeed time their ownership transfer to minimize their gift tax. Besides, when gift tax rate is higher, the negative cumulative abnormal returns before CEOs’ ownership transfer is more significant. In other word, the ownership transfer timing is more pronounced if the gift tax rate is higher. Moreover, for the higher ownership transfer rate subsample, the cumulative abnormal returns is significant negative before CEOs’ ownership transfer, and the abnormal returns is significant positive following CEOs’ stock gifts to family members for the lower ownership transfer rate subsample. Finally, if the ownership transfer occurs in December, the cumulative abnormal returns is significant negative before CEOs’ ownership transfer, and the abnormal returns is significant positive following CEOs’ stock gifts when the ownership transfer occurs in months other than December. In summary, the empirical results find the chairman or CEOs indeed transfer stocks to their family members as gifts when their stock prices were perceived to be low. However, the ownership transfer timing effect is found just before CEOs’ stock gifts to family members. After CEOs’ stock gifts date, stock prices do not increase significantly. |