中文摘要 |
交易成本理論指出,企業會相互投入專屬資產於雙方的合作關係中。Kang, Mahoney, and Tan(2009)發現台灣許多代工業者常僅單方面投入專屬資產,買方卻沒有投入互惠專屬資產,並推斷其原因是因為代工廠能從此合作關係中得到技術及名聲提升的外溢效果。本研究將外溢效果依March (1991)的雙元性討論,以改良型(exploitative)與探索型(explorative)外溢效果來探討與專屬資產投資的關係,及需求不確定性對此關係的影響。本研究針對台灣電機電子工業同業公會之會員進行問卷發放。結果顯示不同的外溢效果對於雙方交易投入專屬資產有顯著不同的影響;在需求不確定性高時,供應商的專屬資產投資與雙元能力外溢有關;在需求不確定性低時,則與聲譽外溢有關。買方的互惠專屬資產投資則只受供應商雙元能力外溢及供應商專屬資產投資的影響。 |
英文摘要 |
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) indicates that firms invest in specific assets to signal their commitment to a cooperation relationship, while the collaborating half also invest reciprocally. Kang, Mahoney, and Tan (2009) observe that many Taiwanese OEM manufacturers only invest unilaterally without the buying firms making reciprocal investments. The authors propose that this observation may be due to the presence of spillover effects in technological skills and reputation. March (1991) indicates that spillover effects can be both exploitative and explorative, or ambidextrous in nature. This study uses multi-group structural equation models to analyze the survey data from members of the TEEMA. The results show that spillover effects have various impacts on the use of specific and reciprocal investments. When demand uncertainty is high, suppliers’ specific asset investment is positively related to their capablity spillover, and is only related to the repution spillover when demand uncertainty is low. |