兩岸內線交易民事責任規範研究

Comparison on the Civil Liability Regulations of Insider Trading between Taiwan and China

中國大陸及台灣面臨證券市場內線交易民事損害賠償制度中，內線交易與投資人損失間因果關係之推斷標準，以及計算投資人損害金額等爭議問題。欲從內線交易獲利，必須利用內線消息本身所存在之財產價值，投資人是否因內線交易而受損，以及內線交易者是否直接因內線交易行為而獲利，皆與證券市場本身反映消息的效率相關。故本文以效率市場假說（Efficient-Market Hypothesis，EMH）為前提，從中國大陸及台灣的證券市場效率性，和內線交易實際規範和實務現況出發，探究內線交易相關民事責任，應否建立起量化計算損害之機制，並細化內線交易對投資人造成之實際影響，依內線交易之個案事實，區分交易者為外部投資人或內部股東，以及重大消息本身屬於正面或負面消息等情形。

Regarding insider trading in the securities market, Taiwan and China have both encountered disputes in their civil damage compensation system. These experiences include the criteria for determining the cause-effect relationship between insider trading and the loss of the investors and the methods for calculating the amount of damage thereto. To profit from insider trading, it is necessary to make use of the property value of the information itself. The efficiency of the market in responding to new information is one of the factors that determine whether an investor would suffer from a loss or whether an insider would profit directly from insider trading. Based on the Efficient-Market Hypothesis (EMH), this study starts with an exploration on the efficiency of the securities markets in Taiwan and China, and a review on the prevailing regulations and practices on insider trading. The purpose is to decide whether it is necessary to build up a quantitative mechanism to measure the damage caused by insider trading and the corresponding civil liabilities. A refined analysis has been made, in the meantime, on the actual impact of insider trading on investors. Based on the facts of the cases studied, the analysis is made, respectively, from the perspectives of traders (external investors or internal shareholders) and the nature of important information (positive or negative information).