董事會政治關聯、客戶重要性對財務報導舞弊之影響

Impacts of Board Political Connection and Client Importance on Fraudulent Financial Reporting

本研究探討董事會政治關聯以及公司對會計師的重要性，對公司發生財務報導舞弊之影響。實證結果發現，董事會具政治關聯的公司，財務報導舞弊發生率較低。受查公司對簽證會計師的重要性愈高，會因為會計師對客戶的經濟依賴效果大於聲譽維護效果，而導致財務報導舞弊發生的機率加。由四大會計師事務所查核與公司支付審計公費較高，能降低財務報導舞弊的發生率。在公司治理變數方面，核心代理成本愈高，發生財務報導舞弊的機率愈高，而獨立董事席比、機構投資人持股比率、董監事持股比率，能夠降低財務報導舞弊發生之風險。本研究之實證結果支持公司的董事會成員具政治關聯以及會計師事務所透過品質管制以強化會計師的獨立性，皆有助於提升公司治理品質，進而降低財務報導舞弊的風險。

This study examines the impacts of board political connection and client importance on fraudulent financial reporting. The empirical results reveal that firms with board political connection have lower occurrence rate of fraudulent financial reporting. However, client importance is significantly positively associated with the incidence of fraudulent reporting because the effect of economic dependence is stronger than the concerns of reputation protection for the auditors. Firms that were audited by Big-4 and paid higher fees have lower occurrence rate of fraudulent financial reporting. As to the corporate governance variables, firms with higher core agency costs have higher likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. Firms with higher percentage of independent directors on the board, institutional investor ownership, and director and supervisor ownership have lower likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. The empirical results support that having politically connected board of directors in the firm can improve corporate governance as well as having audit firms that strengthen their independence through quality control. With improved corporate governance quality, firms therefore can mitigate the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting.