克己復禮為仁──論儒家實踐理性類型學的後習俗責任倫理學重構

Mastering Oneself and Returning to Propriety is Ren: On the Reconstruction of the Confucian Typology of Practical Reason

對於《論語》「克己復禮為仁」的涵義，自漢、宋以來，一直存在著難解的爭議。本文將借助「後習俗責任倫理學」的觀點，說明孔子主張「仁」應包含「克己」與「復禮」之辯證統一的關係，即意在以同時具有道德自我立法與社會團結整合之主體性實踐能力的「仁」，為內聖外王的實踐理想建立主體性的根據。準此，本文將先針對「克己復禮為仁」的不同詮釋，進行一種實踐理性類型學的分析，以指出將「仁」理解為道德自律性或習俗倫理性，都只是片面的觀點。其後，再透過當代道德發展理論的重構，說明孔子以「克己復禮」來定義「仁」，即基於他發現惟有「仁」這種實踐主體，才能分別以孝弟、忠恕與禮治等不同形式，表現出它可以同時做為根源性倫理、可普遍化判斷與社會團結的實踐依據。

Even today the Han-Song debate over the hermeneutic meaning of the Analects’ passage, “mastering oneself and returning to propriety (kejifuli) is Benevolence (Ren)” remains undecided. In this paper, I place the relation between “mastering oneself” and “returning to propriety” into a framework of dialectical unity in order to demonstrate that “Ren,” as practical subjectivity, must include the actual capacities of both moral autonomy and social integration. In order to highlight the one-sided understanding of Han-Song Confucians, who viewed “Ren” either in terms of formal morality or traditional ethics, this paper adopts the viewpoint of the post-conventional ethics of responsibility. In addition to providing a typological analysis of the different interpretations of “mastering oneself and returning to propriety,” it shows that “Ren,” in different stages of moral development, becomes manifest as filial piety, loyalty-forgiveness and the rule of rites. This paper concludes that “Ren” serves as the practical foundation for ethical conduct, generalized moral judgment and social solidarity.