回歸「徹底內在性」——東西方「生命現象學」之比較研究

Return to Radical Immanence: A Comparative Study of Phenomenology of Life East and West

法國哲學家米歇爾．亨利勾劃其思想為一「生命現象學」。提出了「生命就是自感」一口號。「生命現象學」之出現，乃是對胡塞爾的「超越現象學」和海德格的「存有現象學」之反動。簡言之，亨利認為古典現象學只注自於「外出性」，卻漠視了「內在性」即忽略了「生命」。由於亨利認為「徹底的內在性」方是真正的「生命」，所以他要發展一套「生命現象學」來補救此一缺失。本文透過比較明朝末年的劉蕺山與亨利的思想，試圖指出兩者間的一些本質相似性，這可有助于見出蕺山之思想也是一套「生命的現象學」。然而相對於亨利之以「神學」作為「生命的現象學」之基礎的立場，蕺山之思想可為「生命現象學」之發展另闢新途。依亨利、「父位的上帝」是永遠不會直接為人所彰顯，其中必經通過耶穌基督作為中介，而且是可以自存的。不過，按蕺山之立場，雖然「性天之奧」使得「心體」只能「逐步地」、而不可「全幅地」彰著「性體」，但是這並不意謂其中有某些內容永不會被彰著；更重要的是：蕺山肯定「天非人不盡，性非心不體」。此外，於蕺山的進路卻可見出「純情」與「意」之本質性關連，這不會像亨利順著一根源性被動的情感而難以真正奠立「自我性」。

In claiming that life is auto-affection, Michel Henry introduced a phenomenology of life. This signifies a critical reaction to Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and Heidegger's phenomenology of Being. According to Henry, classical phenomenology is imprisoned in ontological monism. He argued that it is only by returning to radical immanence that such a limitation can be overcome. By disclosing the essential affinity between Henry's and Liu Zongzhou's philosophy, this paper aims to show that Liu can be understood as a phenomenologist of life in Henry's sense. Nevertheless, in contrast to Henry's founding of the phenomenology of life upon Christianity, Liu provides a non-theological alternative. In addition, Henry's account for the possibility of selfhood might suffer from the lack of phenomenological evidence. Such a difficulty can be blocked by Liu's stressing the essential link between pure feeling and will.