The Defensive Measures in case of Takeover under German Takeover Act and Delaware Corporate Law

德國併購法與美國德拉瓦州公司法下收購案例中的防範措施

德國公司治理的明顯特徵是採取董事和員工的共同決定制,而美國公司模型所要求的則是股東優先;德國公司須為股東、雇主和社群的共同利益而運作。在全球化的潮流下,歐洲已經面對來自1980年代以來美國大公司併購風潮的壓力。為了回應此風潮,歐盟試圖平衡在其會員國間的各項法律制度衝突。對歐盟而言,由於不同的文化、語言和國家特質,此一挑戰相當艱鉅。德國法律體系呈現出大陸法體系的特質。德國的公司也面對來自全球化與大西洋另一岸的併購潮壓力。在美國,德拉瓦州提供了最重要且資源豐富的公司法案件。為尋求最合理的管制模式,本文討論德拉瓦州公司法併購防禦措施的影響。在德國的模式中,沒有現任大股東的支持,德國上市公司的敵對併購即無法進行。在德國與德拉瓦州公司法的立法比較下,本文嘗試提出可能對抗敵對併購的防禦措施。

The distinct features of German corporate governance are the supervisory board and works council labor codetermination. The American corporation model customarily requires shareholder primacy; on the contrary, the German corporation is required to operate for the common good of shareholders, employees, creditors and communities. With globalization, the Europeans have faced the pressure of the giant corporations resulting from the takeover wave since 1980's in the United States. In response, the European Union has tried to harmonize the various legal systems among its member states. The challenge is a tough task for the European Union due to a variety of culture, languages and national traits. The German legal system represents the features of civil law system. The German corporations have also faced the pressure of globalization and takeover wave from the other side of the Atlantic. Delaware offers the most important and resourceful corporate law jurisdiction in the United States; therefore, the influence of the Delaware takeover defensive measures is considered in this paper in order to find a reasonable way. Due to the concentrated ownership of shares and the codetermination on the supervisory board, a hostile takeover of a German public corporation is not possible without support by incumbent block shareholders. This article works on the possible defensive measures against the hostile takeover under the aspects of legal comparison between German and Delaware Corporate Law.