當科學家遇上蛇魔女：以史坦貝克短篇故事〈蛇〉為起點重省視覺中心主義之侷限

Reconsider the Limitation of Ocularcentrism: John Steinbeck's ＂Snake＂ as a Point of Departure

在史坦貝克的短篇故事〈蛇〉中，一個謎樣女子某日闖入了年輕科學家菲力浦博士海邊的實驗室，堅持要買一條蛇，且要求現場觀看這條屬於她的蛇吃老鼠的樣子，她打亂了科學家規律的工作節奏後旋即消失無蹤。故事中多次形容女子眼神迷濛、彷彿在觀看但眼神卻沒有聚焦，且將她與蛇的意象疊合；而科學家則是被描述為眼神專注、執著於透過顯微鏡來理解世界。本論文透過比較科學家與蛇樣女子感知世界的不同方式，思考前者所服膺的視覺中心主義傳統如何受到後者的挑戰。本文以為，故事中的菲力浦博士一如笛卡爾心物二元論主張下的觀看主體，是個封閉於暗室（camera obscura）中的科學家，其所信奉的視覺中心主義在標榜理性、精準等抽象價值之際，往往讓觀看淪為一種著重主宰操控、爭取認可的行為，也因此忽略了主體與環境的關係其實是由視覺與其他感官知覺經驗所共同決定的。然而故事在凸顯了科學家視野的侷限之際，似乎並沒有建議另一種替代的、較理想的觀看模式，因為蛇樣女子的恣意而為與不按牌理出牌雖然動搖了科學家原本信奉的價值，凸顯了視覺中心主義的問題，但依然不是一種具有倫理可能性的觀看方式；有鑒於此，從〈蛇〉所開啟的問題出發，本論文除了將說明故事中的菲力浦博士如何呈現了視覺中心主義的盲點，也想進一步探討另類的觀看方式為何必要、又如何可能。全文主要章節有三，第一節從歷來關於故事中科學家不解「蛇魔女」行徑的詮釋出發，探討何以在這則充滿觀看意象的故事裡，主角飽受看不懂的焦慮所折磨？第二節帶入暗室理論，將科學家的盲點解讀為笛卡爾式觀看主體所造成的問題，第三節則將援引布雷南、奧力佛、梅洛龐蒂等論者對視覺中心主義的批判，摹描向他者開放的另類觀看方式其可能的樣貌。

In John Steinbeck's short story ＂The Snake,＂ a mysterious woman drops into Dr. Philips's laboratory to purchase a male rattlesnake from the young scientist and insists on watching her snake eat a rat. Disturbed by the woman's weird behavior, Dr. Philips loses track of time and ruins his starfish experiment. He is thrown into crisis after she leaves and even starts to anticipate her return. To his disappointment, the woman never appears again. Even though Steinbeck concedes that he himself does not know the meaning of this ＂damnable story,＂ which is based on an actual incident he witnessed, critics are not hesitant to develop multiple interpretations to unveil its mystery. The story's concern with eyes and the act of seeing, for example, has drawn much critical attention. As we know, the doctor is said to possess ＂the mild, preoccupied eyes of one who looks through a microscope a good deal.＂ The woman's eyes, ＂dark＂ and ＂veiled with dust,＂ immediately remind readers of the rattlesnake, whose ＂dusty eyes seemed to look at nothing.＂ If the imagery of eyes is crucial to our understanding of the story, what does Steinbeck attempt to reveal through his depiction of the scientist's loss of the power of observation? Is he trying to endorse rationalism by characterizing Dr. Philips as a clear-sighted scientist wronged by the snake-woman? Or, on the contrary, does Steinbeck employ the snake-woman as a mirror to the scientist to help readers notice the limitation of ocularcentrism? In the first section of my paper, I argue that the snake-woman, rather than being an inhuman freak threatening to cause the scientist's fall, compels Dr. Philips to learn the disastrous outcome of his exaltation of scientific knowledge. Refusing to look through the microscope, the woman represents a mode of looking that is unimaginable for the young doctor. The second section will analyze how the way Dr. Philips perceives the world can be likened to the Cartesian camera obscura model, which seeks to found knowledge on a purely objective view of the world. Having foregrounded the limitation of the vision-centered philosophy, in the third section I will elaborate why an alternative mode of recognition is essential for the ethics of love to take root. Teresa Brennan, Kelly Oliver and Merleau-Ponty will be drawn on to revisit the intricate relation between vision and ethical obligation.