英文摘要 |
This paper employs the data of listed companies on Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) between 2004 and 2013 to examine the linkage between political connection and corporate dividend policy. To measure political connection, news are screened computed from the Parliamentary Library of the Legislative Yuan (News and Knowledge Management System) by the intersection with to the name of listed companies, board chair name, party, president and party chairman. There are four principal findings. First, full samples analysis shows that company tends to prefer to establish connenction with KMT instead of DPP, and board chair's political connection is larger than company's political connection. Second, under full sample, while connecting with KMT tends to have lower probability of paying dividend, connecting with DPP has higher probability of paying dividend. Connecting with both parties increases dividend payout volatility. Third, during period of DPP as ruling party, little evidience shows that connecting with DDP increases dividend, yet there is significance negative relationship between the degree of political connection with KMT and probability of paying dividends. Finally, during period of KMT as ruling party, evidience shows that connecting with DPP decreases dividend, and there is significance positive relationship between the degree of political connection with KMT and probability of paying dividends. Our evidence shows that the benefit of political connection emerges as a company is connected with ruling party and the cost of political connection emerges as a company is connected with opposite party. Dividend payout as an important corporate governance indicator is associated with political connection. |