荀子性善說獻疑

A Doubt on Xunzian Idea of “Human Nature is Good”

毋庸諱言，在長遠的中國思想史上，「荀子」和「性惡」這兩個詞語之間幾乎可以劃上等號。然而在學術多元的今天，這個連結已有鬆懈之象。愈來愈多學者指出，在荀子哲學中，實未嘗不涵蘊「性善」的觀念。例如傅佩榮先生認為荀子之「惡」並不具備界定人性的有效性，其所隱含的想法乃是「人性向善論」；劉又銘先生主張從「蘊謂」角度看，荀子所持者為一「弱性善觀」，與孟子的「強性善觀」有同等正當性；至乎路德斌先生則論證荀子之人性觀應有「形上」和「經驗」兩層：經驗層為「情」、「欲」等動物性，形上層則是「辨」、「義」等道德性。此可名曰「形上性善論」。本文旨在分析、考察這三種荀子性善說版本，由此論證「性善」或非詮釋荀子人性論的理想模式。

In contrast to the traditional connection between Xunzi and his doctrine of “human nature is evil,” scholars nowadays generally categorize Xunzi as implicitly holding the idea of “human nature is good.” Broadly speaking, there are at least three versions of Xunzian theory of human nature is good that are prevalent among contemporary academia, which include Fu Peirong’s theory of human nature as tending toward goodness (ren xing xiang shan lun), Liu Youming’s concept of weak goodness in human nature (ruo xing shan guan), as well as Lu Debin’s idea of good nature at the metaphysical level (xing shang xing shan lun). This article aims to criticize these three versions of Xunzian goodness, arguing that it may not be a reasonable way to interpret Xunzi as a philosopher with a belief of “human nature is good.”