從“地域回避”到“利益回避”國家治理中地方主官異地任職制度檢討

From Territorial Disqualification to Interest- based Disqualification An Inquiry into the System of Local Leaders' Disqualification from Holding Office in Hometown in China

縣級黨政主要領導的任職回避是中國縣域治理背景中一項重要的制度安排。這項制度被賦予抑制地方主官腐敗、鍛煉幹部等多種功能期待。但在實踐中，這些制度設計的功能預期並未得到有效兌現，而在制度層面，地方主官異地化所帶來的一系列問題日益凸顯，亟待制度重構的系統性回應。應當從中央－－地方關係合理化以及地方治理基本原則的角度，反思長期以來地方主官異地任職制度，構建與完善以利益回避為基礎的任職回避制度，推動地方治理人－－事關係的合法化、合理化以及有效化。

Disqualifying local leaders at the county level or above from holding office intheir hometowns is a crucial mechanism in China's governance. It is expected to perform such functions as curbing corruption and better training the officials. In reality, however, these expected functions have not materialized and many problems actually arise from this mechanism, which needs structural and systematic response. This article argues that such a mechanism should be re-examined and overhauled and that interest-based disqualification system should be established in order to improve central-local relationship and local governance in China.