英文摘要 |
In the People’s Republic of China, a non-democratic state, the supreme command of the army has consistently rested with the Communist Party of China. This system of command is based on subjective civilian control, which is founded on the principle of a “dang zhi hui qiang” (the Party commands the gun) and the “Party’s absolute leadership over the army.” However, in the People’s Liberation Army, the “liang chang zhi” (twin centers) problem of military leadership by political committees and commanders exists. As has been remarked, relations are often tense between these two authorities. If so, how is the supreme command of the Chinese army ensured? With regard to the military command, the political committees and the commanders of the Army, and the staff organizations to which each belongs has been consistently regulated by the Military Commission of the Central Committee of Communist Party of China. Therefore, in this research, the control of the army in contemporary China is clearly described through the regulation of and changes in military command, especially those of committees and headquarters. As a result of this analysis, the “Party’s absolute leadership over the army,” which strengthens the “subjective civilian control” of the army, is demonstrated. |