鼓勵外資政策與國家間衝突之分析（1970-2001）

Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment Promotion Policy and Interstate Militarized Conflict (1970-2001)

鼓勵外來直接投資政策是否隱含國家不願意運用武力來解決國家間衝突的意涵？本文之目的在檢驗國家的提倡外資政策與其主動開啟軍事衝突間的關聯。透過檢視國家的提倡外資政策與其主動開啟軍事衝突間的關聯。透過檢視國家的意向，本文認為鼓勵外資政策隱含國家傾向和平的意涵，這是由於下列兩點因素：首先、一國的鼓勵外資政策與其主動開啟軍事衝突無相容，因為後者將對國家吸引外資的作為帶來負面影響。其次，鼓勵外資政策通常標誌著國家對跨國企業之較為可信的承諾，以維繫和平的環境。由此，採行鼓勵外資政策的國家較少會主動開啟軍事衝突。本研究透過1970年至2001年期間的統計資料，分析鼓勵外資政策與國家開啟衝突間的關聯。研究結果顯示，鼓勵外資的總體政策與國家發動衝突有統計顯著性的負面相關。換言之，提倡外資政策具有減少國家主動開啟軍事衝突的促和效果，亦可知鼓勵外資政策隱含國家具有較低衝突意願的傾向。

Are states with pro-FDI policies less conflict-prone? This paper examines plausible linkages between a state's FDI promotion policy and its desire to initiate conflicts. By focusing on the willingness of the state, I argue that pro-FDI policy may reveal the state's propensity to preserve peace for two reasons. First, pro-FDI policy is incompatible with conflict initiation since the negative effects of the latter offset the state's efforts to increase FDI inflow by the former. Second, pro-FDI policy tends to be credible when it explicitly addresses the state's commitments to multinationals. Hence, states undertaking pro-FDI policies are less likely to initiate conflict in general. By employing various pro-FDI policy indicators, I test the FDI-conflict initiation relationship at the monadic level from 1970 to 2001. Statistical results show that while macro-pro-FDI policies are negatively associated with conflict initiation, treaty-pro-FDI policies do not have the same effect. At both theoretical and empirical levels, this study advances the understanding of the FDI-conflict relationship by demonstrating the possible pacifying effects that pro-FDI policy might have on conflict initiation, and reveals that states with pro-FDI policy tend to be less conflict-prone.