資訊透明度對於權益資金成本之影響

The Impacts of Disclosure Level on Cost of Equity Capital

本文主要檢視台灣上市（櫃）公司資訊透明度，董事會監督機制與權益資金成本之關聯，同時將資訊透明度區分為資訊透明度調升和資訊透明度調降，探討公司治理對權益資金成本之影響。實證結果如下：（1）資訊透明度與權益資金成本呈負相關。進一步區分樣本為資訊透明度上升與資訊透明度下降，發覺資訊透明度變動具有增額資訊內容，故能顯著影響權益資金成本。（2）管理者持股與權益資金成本呈負相關，支持利益收斂假說。（3）控制權與現金流量請求權偏離程度愈大，權益資金成本愈大，顯示核心代理問題確會使投資人要求較高之風險溢酬。（4）權益資金成本會隨董監持股比率及外部董監事比率而減少，但會因董監事股權質押而增加。

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of information transparency and board characteristics on cost of equity capital. The main feature of this study is that we divide the information transparency into grade up-and-down groups, and we explore the relation between corporate governance and cost of equity capital. Overall, this paper expects to explain corporate governance and information transparency can reduce agency problem and the efficient corporate governance can decrease cost of equity capital. The empirical results indicate as follows：First, information transparencyis negatively related to cost of equity capital. Second, managerial ownership is negatively related to cost of equity capital and hence supports convergence-of-interest hypothesis.Third, as controlling right deviates from cash flow right, cost of equity capital is getting worse, that is, core agency problems become more serious in the firm. Finally, the shares of board directors and the number of the outside directors have negative relationship with cost of equity capital, but the pledged share ratio of directors have positive relationship with cost of equity capital.