匈牙利監察使與憲法法院的競合關係：2012-2013

Harmony And Dis-harmony in the Office of the Ombudsman And the Constitutional Court of Hungary 2012-131

The Fundamental Law and the new Ombudsman Act widely changed the ombudsman system in Hungary that was created in the mid-1990s. This essay examines these changes of four years ago. The research focuses on the alteration of the institution of the ombudsman, how the system changed from separated functioning into a unified system and its new way of relating to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court itself is also discussed. The Fundamental Law brought several alterations to the Hungarian constitutional system. It came into force on 1 January 2012. Along with many other changes in the public law, it put an end to the four separate ombudsperson system and created a single ombudsperson system, where only one person holds this duty. This new system does not mean centralization, but it shows the way how to prevent the dissipation of resources and energy. The former system did not allow for joint, collective protection of human rights. My thesis is that the effectiveness of the protection of human rights is not primarily determined by the number of ombudspersons, but by the person who holds the position and the system – including the preparedness of the staff – functioning behind him or her. The institution of the ombudsperson has independence in the state structure. This does not mean that it is a separate state power. Due to its controlling function it is kind of an outstanding institution, because it cannot be classified into any of the three state powers of Montesquieu’s thesis. Hungary established the Ombudsman Office in 1995, under a regulation adopted in 1993 (Act LIX of 1993 on the Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil Rights). In the new monocratic structure of 2012 there is one single Commissioner for Fundamental Rights (Ombudsman or Ombudsperson). Under him/her is a Deputy Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, responsible for the protection of the interests of future generations, and a Deputy Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, responsible for the protection of the rights of nationalities living in Hungary. It is important to mention that the new model’s highest innovation is the ability to initiate abstract normcontrol. However, I would also like to highlight that this innovation was only illusory.

《基本法》與新的《監察使法》大幅改變了匈牙利於1990年代中期所建立的監察體系。本文將檢視四年前發生的這些變化。研究重點集中在監察制度的變遷，究竟監察體系如何從分工的職能設計，轉變成統一的體系？同時，新的體系與憲法法院之間的關係又是如何？另外，本文也會針對憲法法院本身進行探討。《基本法》於2012年1月1日生效，為匈牙利的憲政體制帶來好幾項改變。隨著公法上的改革，《基本法》廢除將監察權力一分為四的體系，建立由單一監察使專責的制度。新制度的基本精神並非要走向中央集權，而是要避免疊床架屋造成資源與精力的浪費。另外，舊制度也不允許聯合或集體人權的保障。我的主張是，要獲得人權保障的成效，其重點不在於監察使的人數，而在於監察使背後協助她／他行使職權的人士，包括機構職員所進行的準備工作。監察機關在國家架構中具有獨立性，但不代表分離於國家權力之外。基於其監察性質，監察使是個特殊的制度，無法納入孟德斯鳩的三權分立理論當中。匈牙利根據為1993年通過的一項規定（即議會民權委員會1993年第59號法案）於1995年成立監察使辦公室。而在2012年新的單權架構中，只有一位「基本人權委員」（即監察使）。其下有兩位「基本人權次委員」，一位負責未來世代的權益保障，另一位負責居住於匈牙利境內各民族的權利。重要的是，此一新的制度最引人矚目的創新之處，為其能發動抽象規範上的監察。但我也要特別強調，這項創新實在只是鏡中水月，難以實踐。