英文摘要 |
During the Battle of Menglianggu in Shandong, the highly elite 74th Organized Division of the Nationalist Army was outnumbered by Communist forces, and was eventually eliminated on May 1947. The command authority of the Nationalist Army for this battle was vested in Gu Zhutong, who made erroneous interpretations of intelligence reports, ignored more accurate reports from front line troops, and thus lost the opportunity to effect rapid support, all of which constituted major factors in the Nationalist Army’s heavy losses. However, Chiang Kai-Shek’s information came from Gu, and when that division retreated to Menglianggu and the battle was in its critical stage, Gu made erroneous interpretations of field intelligence, and delayed support operations by one day, resulting in the entire division is being eliminated. Although Chiang directly issued support orders again to all army groups and organized divisions, it was too late. |