支持開放的國內政治聯盟對政治領袖的影響力：「貿易互賴」與「國際衝突」關係中的關鍵調節變數

The Influence of an Internationalizing Coalition on Political Leaders:A Key Intermediate Variable in the Relationship between Trade Interdependence and International Conflict

貿易與衝突之間的關係長期以來都是國際政治經濟學界所關注與辯論的重要議題。在宏觀理論層面上，不同的現實主義學者、自由主義學者和貿易條件主義學者之間對於貿易互賴究竟是帶來衝突還是和平有著不同的論述。而在經驗證據的統計分析上，採用大樣本統計的實證研究也發現了矛盾的結果。本文的理論認為，在國家配對的分析單位中，因為貿易互賴所造成的贏家和輸家將在兩國的國內分別形成支持開放的政治聯盟和支持封閉的政治聯盟，由於這兩個聯盟獲利基礎的不同，支持開放的政治聯盟偏好維持貿易關係，支持封閉的政治聯盟偏好減少貿易關係，若前者在國內政治上取得優勢（對政治領袖的政治生存來說是重要的考量），則出現衝突的時候政治領袖在考量貿易因素的顧慮下將減少使用武力的機會，若後者在國內政治上取得優勢，則出現衝突的時候政治領袖比較可能不考慮貿易因素而增加使用武力的機會，所以兩國之間的貿易互賴對減低軍事衝突發生的影響力是受到支持開放的政治聯盟對政治領袖的影響力所調節（mediate）的。本文運用賽局模型來分析理論的邏輯性，接著使用勝算對數模型來進行統計上的檢證，並且根據對資料與模型的解讀做出政策建議。本文的理論並發現了一個值得注意的現象：雖然雙方支持開放的國內政治聯盟的力量愈強愈有助於降低雙邊軍事衝突發生的機率，但這並不代表是一種正面的和平，在和平的背後可能隱藏了國家為了避免軍事衝突而不惜接受對方脅迫的可能性。

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the influence of an internationalizing coalition on political leaders is a key mediating variable in the relationship between trade interdependence and international conflict. In the literature, scholars have contradicting theories and empirical conclusions about whether trade interdependence promotes peace or conflict. In this article, I argue that, dyadically, the pacifying effect of trade interdependence is conditional upon the influence of an internationalizing coalition on both political leaders. When the support of internationalizing coalitions is important to both leaders' political survival, the leaders will be more reluctant to use militarized measures to solve international disputes because the use of force will compromise the internationalizing coalitions' opportunity to make money. On the other hand, if the support from the internationalizing coalitions is not important to both leaders' political survival, the leaders will feel less constrained to use militarized measures. The underlying assumption is that internationalizing coalitions always prefer a peaceful and stable commercial environment to a conflictual one, because a conflictual situation hurts their commercial interests. I use a game-theoretical model to demonstrate the logic of this theory and then test it with logit and generalized estimating equations (GEE) models using data from 1962 to 2001. Besides, the game-theoretical model also points to a phenomenon that is worth paying attention to: as the influence of internationalizing coalitions on both political leaders increases, the probability of a militarized interstate dispute decreases, but this does not guarantee a positive peace-under some situations peace is built under the disguise of successful coercions. Based on this finding, a policy implication regarding the Cross-Strait relationship is suggested in the last part of this paper.