英文摘要 |
The concept of moral hazard has profound impacts on many countries' health insurance policies. Its theoretical framework, however, has been contentious among academics, especially health economists. This academic debate originated from two major sources: the transformation of the definition of, and the competition among different theoretical foundations for moral hazard. The inquiry about the definition and transformation of moral hazard has largely been absent from Taiwan's academic literature. Consequently, misunderstandings about the concept of moral hazard in health insurance abound in Taiwan's academic and policy worlds. The purpose of this article is to investigate the historical development of and transformation in defining moral hazard, and to introduce a new conceptual framework of moral hazard and its policy implications. We begin by introducing the original definition of moral hazard in the context of agency relationships, followed by discussing moral hazard in the framework of consumer incentives. Through the discussion of the price effect of moral hazard and its related theory on the demand for health insurance, we discuss how theory of moral hazard has been frequently misunderstood and misused in health policies. This is followed by discussing the income effect of moral hazard and how it can correct the misunderstandings of price effect of moral hazard in health policies. Further, we also introduce new concepts of moral hazard and propose a future direction of research on health insurance-related moral hazard. Finally, we discuss the significance and implications of the transformational concept of moral hazard to Taiwan's social policies. |