薪酬索回條款資訊內涵影響因素之探討

Determinants of the information content of clawback provisions adoption

以2003 至2012 年自願採用薪酬索回條款的美國公司為樣本，本文利用事件研究法估算各事件窗期的累積異常報酬來衡量公司宣告薪酬索回條款的資訊內涵，依據薪酬索回條款採用前的裁決性應計數將樣本區分為低盈餘品質與高盈餘品質兩類公司、將薪酬索回條款型態區分為違反法令之不法行為與錯誤基礎、引進市場狀態，透過均數差異檢定與迴歸分析探討資訊內涵的影響因素，實證結果顯示，投資人對於低盈餘品質公司採用索回條款有正向評價；設定不法行為做為索回條款基礎引發正向的市場反應；當股票市場狀態不佳時，採用薪酬索回條款會產生正的市場報酬；而當低盈餘品質的公司採用不法行為基礎之索回條款時，市場會給予更高的正面評價。

By using clawback provisions adopters in the U. S. during the period of 2003 to 2012 as a sample, this paper first utilizes event study to estimate the adopters’ accumulated abnormal returns to measure the information content of clawback provisions adoption. Subdividing the adopters into low and high earnings quality firms based on pre-adoption discretionary accruals, classifying the adopters into misconduct- and error- based groups according to the types of clawback provisions, and introducing the market condition, the difference-of-means test and regression analysis are, then, applied to investigate determinants of the information content of clawback provisions adoption. Empirical results show that adopting clawback provision leads to positive market reactions for firms with high discretionary accruals, adopting misconduct-based clawback and in the bear market. When firms with low earnings quality adopt misconduct-based clawbacks, they would obtain higher positive market reactions.