專業經理人職位的代理意涵：台灣電子業家族企業之實證分析

The Agency Implication of a Professional Manager's Position: An Empirical Study of Family Businesses in Taiwan's Electronic Industry

家族式經營是華人企業普遍的治理模式，電子產業的家族集團企業由於產業競爭特性，家族勢必要依賴專業經理人協助企業經營，另外，隨著集團企業的擴張，家族透過層層股權控制鍊掌握分子企業的決策權，因此，電子產業家族企業所衍生的代理問題與治理機制受到重視。本研究從代理理論觀點，以台灣63家電子業家族上市公司為對象，嘗試從長期角度分析高階經理人擔任董事職位，對家族股權結構與績效之間關係的影響。結果顯示，家族直接持股愈高，對績效有正向影響，同時，專業經理人董事愈多，將強化家族直接持股與績效間的正向關係，以及弱化家族間接持股對績效的負向影響。研究結果對於討論專業經理人職位之代理意涵，以及電子產業家族企業治理議題，具有相當之意義。

Family governance is a typical governance structure in publicly traded firms in Taiwan and around the world. The founding family of a firm can choose direct ownership or a pyramidal ownership structure to achieve control over a publicly traded family business or a family business group. In addressing performance issues in family businesses, the family ownership structure could generate positive or negative impacts on performance. Thus, determining the contingent condition that will moderate the relationship between family ownership and performance is a key concern in family businesses. Utilizing longitudinal data in family businesses in Taiwan's personal computer industry, this study examines the relationships between the roles of professional managers on the board, the family ownership structure, and the firm's performance from agency theory viewpoint. The results indicate that the professional manager's position on the board will moderate the relationship between the family ownership structure and performance. Specifically, the professional managers serving as directors will enhance the positive impact from family direct ownership on performance and mitigate the negative performance impact from family pyramidal ownership. This study extends the principal-agent and principal-principal agency arguments by further considering the role of the professional manager's position in family businesses.