英文摘要 |
Much prior research has documented that boards of directors or compensation committees often adjust specific earnings components when setting the earnings-based compensation of top management teams (TMTs). When an earnings-decreasing component is related to a value-creating activity, the board would reduce the compensation weight on this component, so as to lead managers to put greater emphasis on the firms' long-term prospects. However, this compensation adjustment decision may diverge from the optimal adjustment level if top managers have a significant influence on the board of directors. This is a particularly common phenomenon in Taiwan, an emerging country with weak corporate governance relative to the U.S. Focusing on 'asset write-down' which has a significantly negative effect on earnings and book value, we first examine whether boards of directors in Taiwan reduce the sensitivity of TMT members' pay to a loss on asset write-down. Next, we examine whether the sensitivity-reducing effect increases with the degree of the TMT's power. Using a sample of Taiwan's publicly traded firms over the period 2005-2010, we find that the annual pay of TMT members is less sensitive to the loss on asset write-down than to the reported earnings. In addition, we find that the sensitivity of TMT's pay to asset write-downs is particularly low for powerful TMTs. Overall, this study provides evidence that the design of TMT members' compensation is not only associated with the optimal contracting perspective, but also with the managerial power perspective. |