英文摘要 |
Taiwan’s electoral system was in June 2005 reformed from a mixed system of a multi-member district single non-transferable vote (SNTV) plus a closed-listed proportional representation system to a mixed system of a single member district plural system plus a closed-listed PR system. Do legislators’ representative styles and behavior change because of the electoral reform? In this article, I focus on the bills introduced by legislators from the Fifth to the Seventh Legislative Yuan (from February 2002 to January 2012) to explore whether legislators change or continue their behavior of bill introduction. Several research findings are worth highlighting. First, legislators under the new electoral system introduce even more bills than those under the old system. The number of bills is about three times that of before. This shows that the new system has reinforced the tendency for the legislators to have the incentive to pursue a personal vote. Second, legislators under the new system have a greater incentive to introduce general interest bills. This reflects the fact that legislators under the new system have a motive for attracting more than 50 percent of the voters so that they are motivated to propose general interest bills. This finding supports the median voter theorem: under a twocompetitor race in a single member district plural system, competitors have the incentive to take the position of the median voter. However, most bills introduced by legislators have only 1 to 2 articles and most of them are small-scale amendments so that legislators do not have to spend too much time and resources. Therefore, the increasing number of bills proposed by legislators does not mean that legislators are directing more efforts towards legislation, nor does it mean that the quality of legislation is enhanced. |