董監事股權質押與公司治理之研究

Share Collateralization by Directors and Corporate Governance

本研究探討董監事股權質押是否造成公司控制股東與小股東之間的代理問題。本研究也探討，對於高質押的公司而言，扣除股權質押後的董監事實際持股對績效的影響是否顯著高於董監事名目持股。實證結果發現：（1）董監事股權質押比率與控制股東盈餘席次偏離程度有關。（2）董監質押比率越高的公司，其信用風險也越高，且監察人缺乏獨立性的情形也越嚴重。（3）對高質押公司而言，扣除質押股數後的董監事實際持股比率才是董監事監督能力的適當衡量。

This study explores how director share collateralization induces agency problems between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders. This study also examines if the effect of directors' real ownership defined as their nominal ownership subtracting their share collateralization on firm performance dominates that of nominal ownership for firms with high director share collateralization. Our empirical results show that director share collateralization exaggerates the deviation between cash flow rights and share controlling rights. Firm credit risk increases and supervisor independency decreases with director share collateralization. Finally, for firms with high director share collateralization, directors' real ownership instead of the nominal ownership is a suitable measure for the monitoring power from directors and supervisors.