英文摘要 |
There is a general phenomenon of central agency problem in Taiwan listed companies. This paper mainly explores the relationship between family control and corporate social performance. Besides, the information constitutes the structure of social network in an equity market which functions as the base of interaction among the actors. This study further tests separately transparency of information disclosure, the frequency of analysts' earnings forecasts, and institutional ownership as a moderator. The empirical results indicate that there is a significant positive relationship between family-controlled firms and corporate social performance. Additionally, family-controlled firms with more transparency of information disclosure and the frequency of analysts' earnings forecasts; they will have better corporate social performance. These findings indicate that the transparency of information networks can bring about benefits of network centrality; the frequency of analysts' earnings forecasts can result in leverage diffusion of information. Finally, family-controlled firms with higher ratio of institutional ownership, the better the corporate social performance will be. This finding explains how institutional investors can promote the sharing of fine-grained information as well as execute a supervisory role. The moderating effects of transparency of information disclosure, the frequency of analysts' earnings forecasts, and institutional ownership on the relationship between family control and corporate social performance are significantly positive. This study claims that the concept of social network embeddedness could depict the action motivation of actors in a capital market. |