從史托姆競爭性政黨行為理論探究梅克爾大聯合政府時期聯邦朝野政黨關係

The Relationships between Oppositions and Government at Federal Level during the Period of Merkel's Grand Coalition: Through Theory of Competition Parties' Behavior from Kaare Strøm

半總統制研究的傳統智慧指出，一致政府比少數政府更容易出現政治穩定和較少的政治僵局。然而，我們觀察台灣的一致政府運作，其還是出現了行政和立法部門之間的衝突或行政內部的分歧。為何一致政府會出現府、會不同調或府、院不協調的現象，以及這些現象對於半總統制的運作，產生何種的影響等問題是本文主要的研究關懷。本文研究發現如下：第一、一致政府時期，特定一些法案的通過彰顯國會對於總統或行政部門的制衡；第二、總統權力的延伸，限縮了行政院院長的權力和自主性以及促成內閣決策的非集體化；第三、總統化的現象，弱化政黨的功能；第四、雖然台灣的總統國會制並沒有經歷民主崩潰，但是這樣的體制即使在一致政府的型態下，還是不太容易運作。最後，本文透過台灣個案的分析，來挑戰總統國會制之一致政府較可能出現憲政運作順利的觀點。

Conventional wisdom on semi-presidentialism has claimed that unified governments can entail more political stability and less political deadlock than minority governments. However, when we observe the operation of unified governments in Taiwan's semi-presidential trajectory from 2008 to 2012, we can identify political cleavages within the executive and political conflicts between the executive and legislative branches. Why do unified governments in president-parliamentarism still suffer serious political cleavages within the governing party? Our findings are below. First, Taiwan's parliament passed some controversial bills to rebel against the president's authority or preeminence over the parliament. Second, the enlargement of presidential real authority or power has curtailed the autonomy of the premier and cultivated non-collectivization of the cabinet. Third, the phenomenon of presidentialization has weakened the functions of the ruling party. Fourth, Taiwan as a president-parliamentary system, one subtype of semi-presidentialism, did not experience democratic breakdown but the system was difficult to operate even during the period of unified governments.