市場結構、審計品質與簽證價值

On Market Structure, Audit Quality and Attestation Value

在亞洲地區，許多企業主擁有公司大多數的股權，甚至擔任企業經理人，所以審計品質的問題本質與歐美國家不一定相同。本研究基於此經營特性，運用賽局理論分析企業主（並擔任企業經理人）、會計師與外部投資人的互動行為；探討市場結構、審計品質與簽證價值之關係；進而解釋實證上低價競爭不一定存在，及審計公費與審計品質關係不一致的理由。本文指出，審計品質與簽證價值的關係，將隨市場結構不同而異化。不同的市場結構，會計師之間競爭程度不同，所以未控制市場結構變數之實證研究，不一定能找到低價競爭的證據。此外，不同的市場結構有不同的簽證價值，審計公費將因簽證價值而變化，若未控制市場結構變數，實證上審計公費與審計品質的關係可能不一致。由於各國的審計市場可能不同，盲目承襲美國的制度或接受其研究結論是不恰當的。 Agency theory is the primary methodology for studying the topics of the audit markets in USA. That theory focuses on the principal-agent relationship of enterprisers and managers. However, dealing with an enterprise, the attitudes of the enterprisers in Asia compared are different from those in the USA. This is because most of the enterprisers in Asia own a large number of shares, and generally become managers of the own companies. Therefore, the problem of examining audit quality in Asia is different from that described in relevant literature in USA. Due to this distinction among businesses, this paper develops a game model to understand the mutual relationships among audit market structures, audit quality, and attestation values by analyzing the interactions among managers, CPAs, and outside investors. This paper shows that different market structures can affect the relationship between audit quality and attestation values. The proposed game model helps explain the empirical findings regarding the inconsistency of payment-cutting competition in audit markets and the low association between audit payments and audit quality. Different market structures lead to differences in audit quality and attestation values. Facing various market structures, CPAs generally lie on the proper level of competition such that payment-cutting phenomena may not appear in audit markets. In fact, previous research shows that different audit market structures lead to various evaluations of attestation values that change audit payments. As a result, empirical research presents inconsistent findings regarding the relationship between audit payments and audit quality. Since the audit market structures in different regimes may be completely distinct, studies that blindly follow American regulations may be inappropriate.