Information Asymmetry and Its Interaction with Budgetary Participation and Budgetary Emphasis on Budgetary Slack: Additional Evidence

資訊不對稱和預算參與、預算強調對預算寬列之交互作用

This paper provides additional empirical evidence on the relationship between budgetary participation and budgetary slack discussed and analyzed in Dunk's (1993) work. In that study, Dunk failed to provide findings to support his hypothesis. Rather, he found that the slack would be higher (lower) when budgetary participation, budgetary emphasis, and information asymmetry are low (high). The paper uses moderated multiple regression to test the three-way interactive effect between budgetary participation, budgetary emphasis, and information asymmetry. The empirical analysis based on a sample of 152 subunit managers of manufacturing companies in Taiwan provides results to support the existence of the three-way interaction between budgetary participation, budgetary emphasis, and information asymmetry affecting budgetary slack and support the findings for low (high) slack in total effect when the predictors are high (low), as the findings in Dunk's (1993) work. Dunk(1993) 探討預算參與和預算寬列之關係，該研究的結果發現當預算參與、預算強調和資訊不對稱為低（高）時，預算寬列會較高（低），此結果並未能支持其假設之預期。本研究採用調節複迴歸檢測此三項預測變項的交互作用效果以提供另一個實證證據，而分析的樣本為臺灣地區製造業的 152 位部門經理， 結果支持預測變項的三維交互作用效果， 但亦如 Dunk (1993) 的結果一般，就總效果而言，當預測變項均為低（高）時，預算寬列會為高（低）。