英文摘要 |
The purpose of this research wants to explore how a senior manager of listed company can manipulate financial statements/ accounting entries without taking the maximum shareholder’s benefits into consideration. The research also uses the cash flows for operation, company size, debt ratio and bankrupt index as the independent variables and the decisive accounting entries as a dependent variable, to measure the relation among them. Audit independence of accountant would be quantified to high quality of audit and low quality of audit. The manipulation of accounting entries related to level of audit quality is also investigated.This research uses Jones Model absolute value of discretionary accruals to measure the independent degree of accountant. It also oversees the relation between independence of accountant and manipulation of discretionary accruals for the listed companies from 2002 to 2006. The research uses the cash flows for operation, company size, debt ratio and bankrupt index as independent variables of inspection if senior managers manipulate discretionary accruals. Using the cash flows for operation, company size, EBIT and debt ratio to test whether the independence of accountant has impacts on manipulation of discretionary accruals.The experimental result of a senior manager in a company with low cash flows for operation, small company size, low debt ratio and high level of bankruptcy (Z<1.3 bankruptcy, Z>2.90 non- bankruptcy) has lower incentives to manipulate discretionary accruals. In the perspective of independence of accountant, companies with better profits, large company size tend to cooperate with high quality of accounting firm. Senior managers in a company with sufficient cash flows and low debt ratio would not tend to manipulate discretionary accruals. In other words, the high quality accounting firms have a better customer choice than the low quality ones in the competitive circumstance. |