Dominant Plants Relocations and Property Rights in China’s Socialist Democracy

支柱企业搬迁与中国社会主义民主政治中的财产权观念

This paper analyzes the emerging issue of dominant plant relocations in China. Dominant plant relocations have the potential to adversely affect a vast number of laid-off workers and their communities. Chinese commentators generally follow many U.S. economists and lawyers in thinking that the impact of dominant plant relocations will be the inevitable result of the adoption of a market economy, and that the freedom to relocate plants, will ultimately promote social efficiency. By comparative analysis, this paper will demonstrate how U.S. policies grant plants near-absolute freedom to relocate, In contrast, some EU countries take employee interests into account through employee involvement in corporate decision making. This enormous divergence in policy is largely driven by different concepts of efficiency, property right and democracy. The prevailing view in both the U.S. and China, that dominant plant relocations are inherently socially efficient, is arguable at best. Social efficiency in itself does not justify the full freedom for dominant plants to relocate. The failure of U.S. policy analysts and policymakers to distinguish dominant plants from non-dominant plants, has prevented them from developing alternative policies to remedy these issues in the U.S. more effectively. China’s socialist democracy embodies the concept of equal access to necessary property, and this concept is fundamental to the socialist democratic way of life. Specifically, this principle establishes people’s rights to employment in the community where they were born or have lived for an extended period of time. Dominant plant relocations effectively render this right unachievable. This, combined with my critique of the efficiency claim, suggests that China must reject the U.S. approach and make progressive regulations regarding plants’ freedom to relocate. These regulations need not resemble regulations in the EU. To invite further debate, I propose separate policies regarding the relocation of state-owned plants and private owned plants. State-owned plants should voluntarily weigh adverse the effects of their decisions. I provide two tentative solutions to private dominant plants. First, is extending the advance-notice period in proportion to the number of employees. The second, is to grant local governments the power to take over dominant plants, provided that just compensation is rendered to plant owners. This solution provides both opportunities and challenges.

支柱企业的跨区域搬迁具有引发巨大负外部社会效应的风险，很可能给雇员和社区整体造成持续性、重大物质损害和非物质影响。我国观察者多盲目追从美国经济学界和法律界，认为企业搬迁的负外部性效应是实行市场经济的必然结果，企业自由搬迁有利于在整体上提高社会经济效率。本文观察到，自20世纪60年代以来，除了美国所采的几近绝对自由的企业搬迁法律政策外，我们还能够观察到一些欧洲国家所采取了不同的法律政策，在一定程度上缓解甚至避免了支柱企业搬迁活动的负外部社会效应。欧美在社会效率、财产权和民主政治等三大问题上的观念分歧，直接影响到前述政策差异。本文初步表明，美国观察者及其中国追随者的观点具有很大的误导性，因为他们没有深入观察“支柱企业”和“非支柱企业”的重大差异，忽视了前者可能引发的巨大负外部性。中国需要吸取美国近半个世纪以来的教训。本文认为，“平等的社会财富获取机会”是我国社会主义民主政治所蕴含的一项基本价值追求。在市场经济背景下，劳动和市场交换是实现该价值的主要渠道。一些支柱企业搬迁不仅是不效率的，而且从根本上阻碍大量公民去平等地获取社会财富。法律有必要对其予以适度管制，以缓解或避免其造成的重大负面影响。例如，大型国有企业的搬迁需要主动考虑其可能造成的巨大社会负外部效应；相关政府部门需通过协同努力，通过改善经营环境避免搬迁诱因的发生，尤其是需要避免资源分配的过度集中化。再如，法律有必要根据私有企业搬迁的规模，适度延长其有义务提前通知政府和雇员的时间。在本文限定的情况下，法律可以考虑赋予政府征收拟搬迁企业的权力。